We introduce a community network model which exhibits scale-free property and study the evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma game (PDG) on this network model.
Introduction
Cooperation is an essential ingredient of evolution. Understanding the emergence and persistence of cooperation among selfish players in evolution is one of the fundamental and central problems. As one typical game, the Prisoner's Dilemma game (PDG), has become a world-wide known paradigm for studying the emergence of cooperative behavior between unrelated individuals. In the original PDG, two players simultaneously decide whether to cooperate or defect. The defector will always have the highest reward T (temptation to defect) when playing against the cooperator which will receive the lowest payoff S (sucker value). If both cooperate they will receive a payoff R (reward for cooperation), and if both defect they will receive a payoff P (punishment).
Moreover, these four payoffs satisfy the following inequalities: T > R > P > S and T + S < 2R. It is not difficult to recognize that it is best to defect for rational players to get the highest payoff independently in a single round of the PDG, but mutual cooperation results in a higher income for both of them.
Therefore, this situation creates the so-called dilemma for selfish players.
To find under what conditions the cooperation emerges on the PDG, various mechanisms of enforcing cooperation have been explored [1] . Departure from the well-mixed population scenario, Nowak and May introduced a spatial evolutionary PDG model in which players located on a lattice play with their neighbors [2] . In each round, players adopt the strategy of their most successful neighbors' in term of their payoff. It has been shown that the spatial effect promotes substantially the emergence of cooperation.
In the past few years, the evolutionary PDG has been studied on different 2 network models such as small-world structure [3] , regular and random graphs by using other mechanisms to enhance cooperation [4, 5, 6, 7, 8] . In all these models, each player occupies one vertex of the networks. The edges denote links between players in terms of game dynamical interaction. Each player just interacts with its adjacent players. Santos et al. have studied the PDG and snowdrift game (SG) on scale-free networks [9] and found that cooperation dominates in both the PDG and the SG, for all values of the relevant parameters of both games [10] . Their results show that the heterogeneity of networks favors the emergence of cooperation. In addition, Much attention has been given to the interplay between evolutionary cooperative behavior and the underlying structure [11, 12] .
In this paper, we focus on the PDG on community networks which can reflect a lot of real-world complex networks such as social and biological networks. The community network model and update rule for the PDG are introduced in Sec. 
The Model
We first construct the evolving network model which exhibits community structure and scale-free properties [13] . We assume that there is a total of assumes that the probability p ij that a new vertex will be connected to node i in community j depends on the degree l ij of that vertex:
; When choosing the vertices to which the new vertex connects in the other communities through inter-community links, one assumes that the probability p ik that a new vertex will be connected to node i in the community k (k = j) also depends on the degree l ik of that vertex: total payoff of a certain player x is the sum over all interactions, so the payoff 5 P x can be written as
where Ω x is the set of neighbors of element x and A is the payoff matrix.
Introduced by Nowak and May [2, 14] , the payoff matrix can be written as a simplified version
where b represents the advantage of defectors over cooperators and 1 < b < 2.
Therefore, we can rescale the game depending on the single parameter b.
After this, the player x will inspect the payoff collected by its neighbors in the generation, and then update its strategy for the next generation to play by the following rule [10] . It will select one player y randomly from its neighbors.
Whenever P y > P x , player x will adopt the strategy of player y with probability given by:
where k > = max{k x , k y } and D = T − S. And k x and k y are the connectivity numbers of player x and y, respectively. We use a synchronous update, where all the players decide their strategies at the same time. All pairs of players x and y who are directly connected on the network model engage in each generation of the PDG by using the update rule of Eq. (4).
Simulations and Discussion
In the following, we show the results of simulations carried out for a popula- From the simualtion results, we have found that the smaller the value of the parameterk, the more favorable cooperation becomes; besides, the smaller the value of the parameter m/n, the more unfavorable cooperation becomes for a given fixedk. These results can be explained in the following ways. The average degreek of the network models can affect the frequency of cooperators [10, 15] . On this community network model, the small value ofk is benefit to cooperation. On the one hand, the heterogeneity of the network structure can promote cooperation; the direct inter-connections of hubs play an significant role in enhancing cooperation [10, 16, 17, 18] . On this network model, the initial-fixed vertices connected to between each community are expected to be the largest hubs in each community. We have found that these fixed vertices are always hubs with largest degree in each community for smallk by data analysis. However, if we increase the value of m or n, the expected hubs may not have the largest connectivity any more, though the degree distribution still obeys a power-law form. More and more older vertices would compete to be the hubs for highk, and then the number of direct links among hubs would decreases. It is because if there are no direct links connecting to any two vertices belonging to different communities initially, they would become unconnected forever. Therefore, large m or n leads to the case that the number of direct links among hubs decreases. This would inhibit cooperation since the number of direct links among larger hubs from different communities decreases. On the other hand, higher connectivity should reduce cooperation;
in particular, more cooperation should emerge if connectivity is low [15] . Our simulation results confirm this conclusion. When we increase the value of m or n, players will have more neighbors, but having more neighbors for players
does not pay at all. Beacuse it would lead the community network to the high connectivity, and then the cooperative behaviour becomes inhibited.
It is well-known that scale-free networks promote cooperation [10] . And scalefree networks have most of their connectivity clustered in a few vertices, like the amplifier structures, such as loops and circulations which are potent for cooperation [19] . While for a given fixedk, the best one for promoting cooperation is to keep n = 0. In this situation, it apparently becomes to be similar to three hubs which are connected to each other. And all the newly growing vertices only connect to other vertices belonging to the same community. Each community is a standard BA scale-free network, so the whole network consists of amplifier structures to promote cooperation. As the ratio m/n decreases, the inner-community links number decreases and the inter-community links number increases. Due to the community structure, in general, the vertices in different communities may not have direct links connecting to each other, then these vertices from different communities do not form loops through intercommunity links. As a result, the number of loops on the community network decreases and the whole network does not favor cooperation. Therefore, when the ratio m/n decreases for a fixedk, the cooperation becomes unfavorable.
Therefore, it is not surprising that the small number of links on this community networks can promote cooperation by considering these factors. Community sturcture is an ubiquitous phenomena in all kinds of complex networks, especially in human society. From our results, taking account into the effect of community structure, some certain community structures promote cooperation greatly; besides, different patterns of links among all the vertices under a given degree-distribution can affect cooperation, especially connections between hubs can enhance cooperation greatly. Moreover, we have confirmed that all the simulation results are valid for different population size N and community size M.
Conclusions
To sum up, we have studied the cooperative behavior of the evolutionary PDG on the community networks and found that reducing inner-community and inter-community links can promote cooperation. The heterogeneity of networks is not always positive to enhance cooperative behavior and the situation of connections among all the vertices, especially some certain structures and direct connections between hubs plays a more significant role in the dominance of cooperation. Graph topology plays a determinant role in the evolution of cooperation [20] . However, it is necessary to explore more direct and essential factors that facilitate cooperation to dominate for future work.
